abstract: Business groups are a prominent enterprise system in most East Asian and emerging economies. This article addresses an important but understudied issue -ownership and control of these large conglomerates. Studying the ownership structure of the top 100 Taiwanese business groups sheds light on the debate between the culturalists and the institutionalists. Culturalists claim family domination even in institutional changes while institutionalists suggest more dispersed and open shareholding after economic liberalization. The longitudinal analysis of group ownership across three time periods reveals a mixed structure. Although the family still controls most of the old, core group members, new firms and joint ventures that are owned by multiple family groups rose significantly during the institutional transition of 1987-93. The evidence shows that organizational changes neither completely comply with emerging rules, nor do they hold on to existing cultural logics. Neither the culturalists nor the institutionalists have correctly predicted the metamorphosis. Rather, the concept of compromise strategy, which allows organizations to retain their core interests while at the same time respond to institutional constraints and/or incentives, provides a proper explanation.
Introduction
Business groups are a special type of enterprise system existing in most East Asian and developing economies (Goto, 1982; Hamilton and Woolsey Biggart, 1988; Granovetter, 1995; Hamilton et al., 2000) . Group members do not operate as isolated units in the market but have institutionalized relationships with each other and work coherently as an entity. 1 With extensive interorganizational connectivity, business groups usually play a central role in the economies in which they operate. Provoked by their organizational distinctiveness and economic significance, scholars have studied the formation process (Numazaki, 1993; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Guillen, 2000a; Chung, 2001) , strategies (Chang and Choi, 1988; Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 2000) and performance (Keister, 1998; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001 ) of these groups. Nevertheless, the critical dimension of ownership and control has not been systematically explored. Based upon deep case research, current studies offer useful insights such as family and Guanxi ownership (Hamilton and Kao, 1990; Orrù et al., 1991; Numazaki, 1992; Kang, 1997; Hamilton, 1997 Hamilton, , 2000 . We still, however, lack large-scale samples to address key issues such as what exactly group ownership structure looks like, how extensive the family holding is and how families maintain their control while groups grow. More importantly, the question of how group ownership evolves during institutional transitions has not been tackled. 2 This gap is especially outstanding given the significant changes of organizational environment in East Asia in the past two decades.
This article deals with this gap by investigating the top 100 Taiwanese groups and their ownership evolution from the 1970s to the 1990s. The longitudinal design sheds light on the debate between the culturalists and the institutionalists on the explanations of East Asian business organizations (Wilkinson, 1996; Lowe, 1998) . Culturalists believing in the power of Chinese familism propose that the ownership and control of Chinese business are concentrated in the few hands of family members even in transitions (Wong, 1985; Redding, 1990; Fukuyama, 1995) . By contrast, legal and finance scholars sticking to regulatory institutions suggest that the newly developed legal regime and rules of corporate governance induce dispersed and open ownership (Roe, 1994; La Porta et al., 1998 , 1999 . The 'Great Transition' in the late 1980s (Tien, 1989) , the biggest wave of economic liberalization and political democratization in Taiwan's modern history, provides an ideal context to test these opposite hypotheses (Chu, 1994 (Chu, , 1995 McBeath, 1998) .
Analysing more than 10,000 shareholdings over time provides fresh insights. Neither the culturalists' nor the institutionalists' theory is confirmed. Rather, a mixed form of group ownership, neither completely dominated by family members nor totally open, emerged during the transition. While entrepreneurs and their families are still in control of most International Sociology Vol. 19 No. 1 group firms, inter-group shareholding and new joint ventures from several groups increased significantly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The outcome is a mixed ownership with the old, core member firms reigned over by the founding family and the new assets jointly owned by several groups. I argue that this is due to a unique strategy adopted by Taiwanese groups. Facing conflicting demands from institutional transitions and internal organizational needs, business groups in Taiwan balanced the different considerations by the 'compromise' strategy, which allows organizations to retain their core interests while at the same time responding to institutional constraints and/or incentives (Oliver, 1991: 153) . The outcome of this strategy, however, is something new and different from what are predicted by current theories. The evidence suggests that organizational changes in institutional transitions do not completely comply with emerging rules, neither do they hold on to existing cultural logics (Stark, 1992 (Stark, , 1996 . Rather, strategic compromise induces new, metamorphosed structure, strategies and practices that facilitate organizational adaptation and survival.
I present the argument in the following order. The next section provides a review of the culturalists' perspective and the institutional approach. The contrasting hypotheses are organized along four dimensions of ownership structure: composition of the shareholders, distribution of the shares, identification of the owners, and cross-group shareholding. I then introduce the data sources and descriptive statistics in the third section. In the fourth section I first present the general trend of intra-group ownership in 1973, 1986 and 1994 . I then demonstrate a network model for the cross-shareholding among group firms for the 1994 data set, where most major shareholders are institutions rather than individuals. This model not only identifies three prototypes of group ownership but also discloses strong family control in the intertwined shareholding networks. A case study of two automobile groups is followed to elaborate the network model. I then turn to the inter-group dimension in the fifth section. The evolution of cross-group shareholding networks indicates significant effects of regulatory institutions. To elaborate, I provide a case study showing the joint efforts of business groups in the newly emerged commercial banking industry. In the concluding section I offer reflections on current theories and directions for future studies.
Theories of Ownership Structure and Taiwan's Experience
The Culturalists' Perspective
Culturalists see organizations as a 'cultural artifact' which manifests the core value of the society in which the organizations operate (Redding, 1990: 143) . They explain organizational structure and processes by shared belief and cognition systems. For a few hundred years, family has been the foundational social and economic unit in Chinese societies. Chinese people treat family business as a part of the asset pool which ought to be maintained within the family and inherited by male descendants (Cohen, 1976; Baker, 1979) . These cultural elements make culturalists argue that the ownership of Chinese firms is concentrated in the hands of family members (Redding, 1990: 143-81) . For scholars who believe in cultural power, family control persists even when environments change. For example, Fukuyama discusses the small size and concentration of family ownership in Taiwan's business groups (Fukuyama, 1995: 69-82) . He argues that under Chinese familism, entrepreneurs trust only family members and close kin and are unwilling to recruit external capital. He hence predicts the minor role played by these groups in economic development. Similarly, Wong (1985 Wong ( , 1988 ) establishes a theoretical model which predicts the organizational evolution (or fate) of Chinese firms by the principle of equal inheritance of family property. 3 This thesis is depicted by Fukuyama (1995: 83-95) as the 'Buddenbrooks' phenomenon, which is parallel to the one described in an Irish saying: 'Shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations'. The image of corporate ownership deriving from this perspective is straightforward: company shares are to be held predominantly by members of the founding families and these families maintain clear property boundaries by avoiding joint ventures or cross-shareholding with other family groups. These tendencies are not likely to change even in environmental upheavals (see Table 1 ).
The Institutional Approach
Distinct from culturalists' concentration on value systems, the recent development of institutionalism (North, 1990 (North, , 1991 Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995) demonstrated the significance of institutional environments on organizational structure. For example, Roy (1997) , departing from Chandler's market-efficiency explanation of modern managerial hierarchies, illustrates the significance of various institutional arrangements. Scott (1994a) , Powell (1996) and Edelman and Suchman (1997) emphasize the legal environments for organizations and propose that laws not only define what a firm is but also what the appropriate structure, behaviours and procedures are inside and between firms.
More evidence is provided by legal and finance scholars. Instead of looking at the agency problem inside the firms, Roe (1994) proposed a legal explanation to Berle and Means's (1932) classic thesis of separation of ownership and control. He argues that different regulatory laws such as the Sherman Act, the Glass-Steagall Act and the Investment Company Act induced the diffused ownership structure in the US by constraining blockholding of company shares by financial institutions. Also focusing on the effects of laws on ownership, La Porta and his colleagues showed that the variation of ownership concentration in 49 countries is due to their different legal regimes providing different levels of minority shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 1998) . 4 In a subsequent study, the authors moved this legal theory a step further by exploring the background of the dominant shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999) . They showed that family and state are more likely to be the major, ultimate owner of large conglomerates in countries with poor shareholder protection.
These well-cited studies assert that institutions, especially laws, are the most salient variable in explaining corporate ownership. Not only the concentration level but also the identification of the controlling owner can be predicted by legal rules. In concluding their research on the ownership of the largest 20 companies in 27 countries, La Porta et al. stated that existing ownership structure is 'primarily an equilibrium response to the domestic legal environments that companies operate in' (La Porta et al., 1999 : 512, cited in Guillen, 2000b . Following this view, the ownership of Taiwanese business groups is expected to be more dispersed and open and embrace more institutional shareholders after the economic liberalization between 1987 and 1993. The following section provides background information for this proposition.
A Brief History of the Institutional Evolution Before and After the Mid-1980s
There is a consensus among scholars that the Taiwanese state, the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), has dominated Taiwan's economy and society since its retreat from mainland China in 1949 (Amsden, 1985; Gold, 1985; Henderson, 1993; Pang, 1992; Wade, 1990) . It has had relatively high autonomy from the economic sector and hence played a guiding role in Taiwan's development in the past 50 years (Evans, 1995) . One important reason is that KMT inherited all the industrial and business firms from the Japanese colonial administration, which formed a large public sector that controlled critical resources for production. 5 To keep its dominance, KMT constrained new establishments in most industries starting from the early 1950s, citing the small domestic market.
Until the mid-1980s, most of the key manufacturing sectors as well as financial industries, public utilities and transportation were still highly regulated and hence were monopolized by the existing, well-connected firms. These highly profitable and capital-intensive businesses started opening to the private sector in the mid-1980s. This constituted the biggest economic liberalization in Taiwan's modern history and the process was accompanied and accelerated by the political democratization started in 1987. 6 Scholars have different explanations for this 'Great Transition' (Tien, 1989) . Some emphasize external forces such as the pressures from the US for fair trade practices and appreciation of Taiwan's currency (Chu, 1994 (Chu, , 1995 Cheng, 2001) , while others focus on internal factors such as political opposition, social movements and dissatisfied capitalists (Wang, 1993: 139-48) .
While it is difficult to reach a conclusion from evidence presented, the outcome of this institutional transition is obvious. Not only were more lenient administrative policies initiated, but new additions and amendments to the legal framework, such as the Banking Law Amendments (1989), Statute for Upgrading Industries (1990), Eighth Revision of Company Laws (1990) , Securities and Exchange Law Amendments (1988) and the Statute for the Transfer of Public-Opened Enterprises to Private Operation (1991), were also inaugurated (Cornell, 1993; Liu and Chen, 1998; Pistor and Wellons, 1998) . In theory, these changes in legal institutions would have substantial impacts on Taiwan's enterprises. The deregulation of financial industries and globalization of capital market is expected to induce more ownership dispersion and institutional shareholding (Useem, 1996 (Useem, , 1998 . Next, liberalization of monopolized industries and privatization of state-owned enterprises created unprecedented capital needs that should call for extensive joint venture and co-ownership. Furthermore, ambiguity and uncertainties induced by institutional transition would move firms to cross-shareholding for hedging and risksharing (Stark, 1996) . These institutional changes thus foresee a structure of group ownership that is in contrast with the one expected by the culturalists. The conflicting predictions juxtaposed in Table 1 generate an interesting question: how exactly did Taiwanese business groups structure their assets during institutional transition? Did they follow the culturalists' path or that of the institutionals'? 
Data
To answer this question, I collected shareholder data on Taiwan's largest 100 business groups at three time points, 1973, 1986 and 1994 . Analysing the trend between 1973 and 1986 serves as a pretest (or control group) to highlight the effects of institutional changes between 1987 and 1993 (Cook and Campbell, 1979) . Data on group shareholders were collected from three editions of the directory Business Groups in Taiwan (1974, 1988/9, 1996 /7), a data source used widely by scholars (Hamilton and Woolsey Biggart, 1988; Hamilton and Feenstra, 1995; Hamilton, 1997; Chung, 2001; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001 ). This directory is compiled by China Credit Information Service (CCIS) in Taipei, the oldest and most prestigious credit-checking agency in Taiwan and an affiliate of Standard and Poor of the US. This directory has been publishing information on the 100 largest Taiwanese business groups (based on sales) since 1974. It is a biennial directory which contains information at the group level such as total assets, net sales, sales growth and so on. More importantly, it also includes information on each of the group firms: the names of the presiding director, the CEO and major shareholders, with the percentage of the share they owned.
Data presented in this study include 323 business groups, 2629 member firms and their 13,326 shareholder positions across three time points. Table  2 shows descriptive statistics of these data. In contrast to most previous studies focusing either on a few cases (Takao, 1989; Numazaki, 1993; Lin, 1995) or on a single time point (Hamilton and Kao, 1990; Orrù et al., 1991;  (1974, 1988/9, 1996/7) , CCIS, Taipei. Numazaki, 1992; Hamilton, 1997) , the following analysis provides more compelling evidence to evaluate the theoretical arguments.
The Intra-Group Ownership Structure and Family Control
The General Trend of Intra-Group Ownership in 1973, 1986 and 1994 This section investigates the intra-group ownership structure of Taiwan's business groups and its evolution from the 1970s to the 1990s. It aims to examine the first three theoretical predictions in Table 1 . Following the analytical framework in Table 1 , the first step is to scrutinize the composition of group shareholders. Figure 1 indicates the increasing importance of institutional shareholders in Taiwan's top 100 business groups. 7 In 1973, 68 percent of groups do not have any institutional actor listed as a major shareholder for their constituent firms. 8 This number decreases to 23 percent in 1986. In 1994, only 6 percent of business groups have no institutional shareholder, and 48 percent of groups have 40 percent or more of their shareholders as corporate actors. Moreover, these institutional shareholders own the majority of shares in their respective firms. This trend seems to confirm the institutional effects on group ownership suggested by the institutionalists.
However, a deeper exploration of the categories of institutional shareholders in 1994 shows that many of these corporate actors are not 'normal' institutional shareholders such as mutual funds, pension systems, or insurance companies described by Useem (1996 Useem ( , 1998 . Rather, they are colleague member firms from the same group or investment and holding Sociology Vol. 19 No. 1 Taiwan's Business Groups, 1973 , 1986 Percentage of institutional shareholders companies controlled by the founding family. Most business groups in 1994 have established extensive intra-group shareholding networks and have one or more investment companies (or holding companies) serving as the control centre for the whole group. The institutional approach hence only skims the surface of what has happened during the transition. To get a full picture, I next examine the distribution and identification aspects of group ownership. Figure 2 shows the ownership concentration ratio over time. This ratio is calculated by 1-{[number of shareholders]/[number of shareholder positions]}. This ratio hence is between 0 and 0.99; the higher the ratio, the more concentrated the ownership is. In this case, shareholders could be individuals and organizations.
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Figure 1 Institutional Shareholders in
The graph shows no distinct pattern among the three time points, which means that although the number of member firms, employees, total assets, sales and proportion of group sales to GNP have increased over time (see Table 2 ), group ownership is still concentrated in the hands of certain actors (both individual and institutional shareholders). 9 The data hence confirm the prediction from the cultural perspective that group ownership remained concentrated after institutional transition. The key question left is whether the shares are concentrated in the hands of family members.
To deal with this issue, the third ratio I calculated is the 'familism ratio', which intends to evaluate the background (identification) of individual shareholders. The way I create this ratio is worth mentioning. I first get a list of individual shareholders in a group; then count the number of names in these positions. Third, I compute the number of family names among these shareholders' names. The familism ratio then is calculated by 1 -{[number of family names]/[number of total names]}. 10 For instance, Group A of 1973 has 11 companies with a total of 19 individuals Taiwan's Business Groups, 1973 , 1986 Percentage of business groups listed as major shareholders. There are 10 names, with five family names that occupy these 19 positions. The familism ratio of Group A is calculated as 1 -(5/10) = 0.5.
At first glance the change of this ratio between 1973 and 1994 does not reveal clear-cut patterns. There are 48 percent of groups with a familism ratio equal to and larger than 0.5 in 1973. The proportion increases to 63 percent in 1986 and goes down to 40 percent in 1994. It seems that the family control of group ownership is not stable over time. The prediction from the culturalists thus is not fully supported. However, since corporate shareholders have become major players in recent years, the familism ratio based on individual shareholders becomes less effective, especially for the year of 1994, as I elaborate later.
The three ratios presented so far analyse the composition, concentration and identification of group shareholders. They provide the following temporary conclusions. First, the group ownership is concentrated in a few hands and this trend is maintained across all three time points. From 1973 to 1986, it is safe to argue that it is the family members, most likely the entrepreneur and his or her partners' families, who dominate the ownership. Family members occupy overlapped shareholder positions in various member firms to achieve dominant control. This pattern is clearly reflected in the high concentration ratio and familism ratio in 1973 and 1986 and supports the culturalists' argument. Nevertheless, the replacement of individual actors by corporate actors as major shareholders in 1994 complicates the story since corporate actors can own and be owned by other shareholders. To fully test the culturalists vs institutionalists thesis, identifying the trend between 1986 and 1994 is critical. I hence move my analysis from shareholder overlap to cross-shareholding network. For this, I build a network model to reveal the intertwined ownership structure of 1994. The concepts of directed graph and equivalence blockmodel from network analysis are employed (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) .
The Network Model and the Ultimate Owner of 1994 Groups
I used procedures of automorphic equivalence and blockmodelling in UCINET IV to identify three prototypes of ownership structure from the 1994 shareholding networks (Borgatti et al., 1991) . 11 The three prototypes are visually presented in Figure 3 , and the average characteristics of groups in each of these three categories are summarized in Table 3 .
Type 1 groups are treated as dominated by individual shareholders due to their low percentage of firms with institutional shareholders, small portion of shares owned by institutional shareholders, or sparse crossshareholding. A close examination of the individual shareholders shows Sociology Vol. 19 No. 1 that these groups are under the direct control of the founder's family. This ownership type is hence identical to that of groups in 1973 and 1986. The owner, with his or her family members and entrepreneurial partners, has direct and overlapped shareholding in most member firms. 12 As shown in Table 3 , Type 1 groups have significantly fewer member firms and employees. Combining with very few public-listed companies confirms that these groups are small and privately family-held enterprises.
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Type 2 is the modal structure, with more than 60 percent of the groups falling into this category. Several network properties are worth mentioning. First, all arrows point to one direction, no symmetrical shareholding is found. This indicates that the ownership control of this kind is highly (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 423) . Second, in a few cases, there might be a second controller position (e.g. the dotted circle in the upper left-hand corner). However, this second controller can never challenge the status of the first controller since it only controls parts of firms. Third, for most of the controller positions, there is only one firm inside. If more than two firms are included, a mutual shareholding tie usually exits. Fourth, in several cases, there might be an isolated position that is not related to any position (e.g. the dotted circle in the lower right-hand corner). The number of firms in the position, nevertheless, is usually very small. These network features are similar to those in the 'pyramid' structure, a multiple-level ownership web among Chilean corporations described by Zeitlin and Ratcliff (1988: 15-75) . The ultimate, dominant shareholders (what they call the 'Kinecon Group') achieve their intercorporate control by staying on top of the pyramid. The major distinction between Type 2 and Type 3 is the mutual shareholding among positions. However, 99 percent of this mutuality involves the controller position. This mutuality hence blurs the boundaries of the role of controller since the shareholding ties are now symmetrical. 13 The first outstanding characteristic of Type 3 groups is their large size: they have significantly more member firms, employees and total assets. It is clear that groups in this category have a larger and more complicated organizational structure. Second, the number of listed companies is also significantly larger than the average. One possible explanation is that the mutual shareholding structure is designed to avoid hostile takeover in the equity market. By holding each other's shares, ownership control is consolidated.
Consistent with the institutional shareholder ratio and the concentration ratio presented in Figures 1 and 2 , the ownership typology demonstrates a consistent, centralized structure in the groups of 1994. Different from the direct family control of 1973 and 1986, the structure of 1994 becomes more indirect due to 'corporatization' of shareholders. The ownership prototypes also locate 131 firms in the structural position of controller in the 1994 networks. Surveying the background of the shareholders behind these firms indicates extensive family control. For individual shareholders, I examine whether they are members of the owner's family and how many shares they hold. The results show that the owner's family owns, on average, 60 percent of the controller's shares, a proportion big enough to control the controller, and through this device, the rest of the group. 14 The distribution is presented in Figure 4 . Figure 4 also shows a second distribution. If we add in those shares owned by institutional shareholders which are de facto controlled by the entrepreneur's family, 15 the average owned by the family rises to 86 percent.
The analysis so far confirms the persistence of Chinese familism in group ownership. Institutional transition in 1987-93, which was expected to induce a more dispersed and open structure, did not affect the family control of intra-group shareholding. Furthermore, with the device of the ownership pyramid, the founding family is able to maintain their control while groups grow. The following case study illustrates my points.
A Case Study of the Yulon Group and the Sanfu Group
This case study is about two motor manufacturing groups, Yulon and Sanfu. Yulon is a typical example of a Type 3 group. It has 22 group firms, 10,542 employees, NT$70 billion in total assets, and two publicly listed companies. As we see from Figure 5 , Yulon's 22 group members are assigned to five positions in the blockmodel: two controllers (C), one intermediary (T), and two receivers (R) (see note 11). The two controllers are linked through a mutual tie and they together control the largest receiver, R2, which contains 14 member firms. There are three firms in the two controllers and the two firms in C1 also own each other's shares, which constitute the control centre of the Yulon Group. One of the two listed companies, Yulon Motor, is in C1 and the other, China Motor, is in C2. For consolidating the ownership, Yulon Motor owns 10 percent of China Motor's shares and in return 16 percent of its shares are owned by China
Motor. An analysis of the shareholders behind the three firms in C1 and C2 discloses substantial family control. For Yulon Motor, the entrepreneur's family, as individual shareholders, own 15 percent of the shares. Another 40 percent is owned by China Motor and Taiyuen Textile, the second firm in C1. The family's non-profit organization, Yen Ching-Ling Industrial Foundation, owns an additional 1.5 percent. In total, the family and the institutional shareholders they dominated own 56.5 percent of shares in Yulon Motor. (The family own 100 percent of the shares in Taiyuen Textile and 58 percent in China Motor.) The network ownership identified shows that by using the pyramid structure, family control of the Yulon Group is consolidated in 1994, stronger than what would have been revealed by the familism ratio (Table 4) . A similar pattern appears in smaller groups such as Sanfu. Sanfu Group is a smaller group with a simpler ownership structure. It has 10 member firms, 1718 employees, NT$11 billion total assets, and one listed company. It offers an example of the Type 2 structure. From Figure  5 , its 10 firms are assigned to four positions. The firm located in C1, Sanfu Motor, has overall control of the R1, T1 and R2. Sanfu Motor is also the only listed company within the group, which constitutes 55 percent of the total employees and 57 percent of the group assets. Distinct from Yulon Motor, Taiyuen Textile and China Motor, which employ mutual Yulon and Sanfu Groups in 1973 , 1986 1973 1986 Proportion 1973 , 1986 . From 1973 to 1986 , the entrepreneur, his or her partners and their families directly controlled most group firms as individual shareholders. They adopted a strategy of overlapped shareholding in multiple member firms to maintain the balance between ownership control and group growth. On the one hand, family members occupied duplicate shareholder positions in various member firms. On the other hand, they enticed different 'external' shareholders to join these firms. 16 These external shareholders, however, seldom or never appeared in more than one firm. This strategy helps explain why the concentration ratio rarely surpasses 0.5 while the familism ratio is always higher. 17 The liberalization of financial industries and capital markets in 1987-93 created an almost unlimited pool of resources for expansion. To tap into this pool while at the same time maintaining family domination, Taiwanese business groups adopted the structure of pyramid ownership. The logic of this structure is similar to that of overlap shareholding: on the one hand, corporatization of shareholding makes it easier for groups to raise funds from the equity markets; on the other hand, staying on top of the ownership chain keeps the ultimate control within the family (Pistor and Wellons, 1998) . This ownership arrangement is clearly identified by the network model and is illustrated by the case study of two motor groups. The evidence presented so far not only shows who control the large conglomerates and how they maintain their control but also confirms three out of the four culturalists' predictions in Table 1 .
Institutional Effects and the Inter-Group Shareholding Network
Most culturalists would probably stop at this point and claim the validity of the deterministic stance (Redding, 1990; Fukuyama, 1995) . However, my analysis of inter-group shareholding networks, the fourth dimension in Table 1 , reveals a challenging picture. My longitudinal design depicts the evolution of the inter-group network over time, and the three time points selected capture the institutional changes between 1987 and 1993. The data show that the institutional changes induced more cross-shareholding and inter-group investment; and this started blurring the group boundaries that were discernible in 1973 and 1986. Although the intergroup ownership network is still sparse compared to that of intra-group's, Chung Institutional Transition and Cultural Inheritance its longitudinal trend does cast doubt on the cultural perspective and inclines to the institutional approach. A database program was designed to run through the data of 13,326 shareholders and identify overlapped shareholders among different groups. An inter-group tie is counted if there is a cross-shareholding network existing between any pair of member firms from two different groups. Table 5 shows that the inter-group network is sparse in 1973 and 1986: the total number of ownership interlocks occupies only a tiny portion of all possible ties. It is only 2.6 percent in 1973 and 2.9 percent in 1986. However, the number rises to 5.6 percent in 1994, almost double within eight years. Although it is still only one-third of the average intragroup network density, it does show the effects of institutional institutions started in 1987. It is safe to argue that the discernible ownership boundaries of Taiwan's business groups have started blurring. The percentage of groups directly tied to at least one other group also confirms this trend -it is about 60 percent in 1973 and 1986 and jumps to 70 percent in 1994.
In addition to the analysis at the aggregate level, Table 6 sketches the networking of individual groups. As expected, the distribution of 1994 differs significantly from that of 1973 and 1986. There is only one group linked to more than 20 other groups in 1973 and 1986 but in 1994, there are 13. Generally speaking, the inter-group stockholding network is relatively stable from 1973 to 1986, a 13-year time period, and becomes significantly denser from 1986 to 1994. Table 5 Inter-Group Shareholding Networks in Aggregate 1973 Aggregate , 1986 Aggregate and 1994 Aggregate 1973 Aggregate 1986 Aggregate 1994 Number While the evidence shows substantial effects of institutional change on group ownership, the network analysis is constrained to the 323 business groups and their 13,326 shareholder positions. In other words, joint venture and co-ownership that cannot be clearly ascribed to a specific group are not included since they will not be listed under any group. In fact, these cases offer stronger support to my arguments. The newly emergent commercial banking industry offers a good example. As part of the institutional change in 1987-93, the Banking Law Amendments passed in 1989 opened a door for the private sector to own and operate commercial banks. However, the threshold to set up a new bank is quite high. To provide assurance to the public, the administrative procedures issued in 1991 set the capitalization of new banks at NT$10 billion (US$367 million). This high standard moves business groups to solicit 'outside' capital. The outcome is more joint ventures among groups and new establishments that are difficult to associate with a single group.
A special issue of the local magazine Fortune (Tsai Hsun, 1992: No. 115, 129-78) provides a general profile of the 14 new banks established around 1992. This report not only describes the general background, but also the top management team and the largest 20 shareholders of the bank. Based upon this information, I cross-checked the data listed in Business Groups in Taiwan, editions 1990 Taiwan, editions /1, 1992 Taiwan, editions /3, 1994 Taiwan, editions /5, 1996 Taiwan, editions /7 and 1998 I first surveyed the institutional shareholders listed under the bank to see whether they are members of a specific group. Second, I examined the individuals listed as the representative for the institutional shareholders. The goal is to see whether they are leaders of business groups or managers of group firms. Last, I checked the background of individual shareholders. I identified 110 of the 285 shareholders listed in the Tsai Hsun magazine as group members. This allowed me to construct a shareholding network of the new banks by 47 business groups. I present the network structure in Figure 6 . Figure 6 clearly shows the mingled attribute in new banks' ownership structure. While Ya-Tai Bank (Bank 8), Fan-Ya Bank (Bank 9) and WanTung Bank (Bank 13) involve only one group, most banks have investment from more than four groups. Some banks such as Fu-Pang Bank (Bank 10), Yuan-Tung Bank (Bank 14) and Hua-Hsin Bank (Bank 11) include as many as seven or eight groups. New banks thus become joint properties of multiple groups. This evidence challenges Fukuyama (1995) and Wong's (1985) prophecy about Chinese familism, and supports a more institutional explanation.
Discussion and Conclusion
The longitudinal analysis of the top 100 Taiwanese groups shows intriguing results. Families dominated the intra-group ownership through overlapped shareholderships and multiple-level pyramids from the 1970s through the 1990s. However, the institutional changes between 1987 and 1993 induced more inter-group cross-shareholding and new properties that are jointly owned by multiple families. The outcome is a mixed ownership that neither the culturalists nor the institutionalists correctly predicted. Figure 7 presents a conceptual scheme to illuminate this mixed structure. The single-line arrows indicate intra-group control and the double-line arrows show inter-group collaboration. While the single-line ties constitute a coherent structure for individual groups, the double-line connections create joint properties among groups. The mixed ownership suggests that perhaps both the culturalists' perspective and the institutional approach are oversimplified and a new angle is needed. The deterministic stance adopted by culturalists such as Wong (1985 Wong ( , 1988 , Redding (1990) and Fukuyama (1995) treats culture as stationary. This view precludes not only the possibility of cultural change but also Sociology Vol. 19 No. 1
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Figure 6 Shareholding Networks of New Commercial Banks by 47 Business Groups
effects from other factors, such as legal institutions. The mixed structure implies that a contingent view that gives more space to cultural permutation and other institutional forces will be more sensible (see Whyte, 1996) . On the other hand, the legal theories proposed by Roe (1994) and La Porta et al. (1998 , 1999 ignore the interests and actions of organizations. Corporations are portrayed as passive actors that only acquiesce to the rules (Chung, 1998) . The mixed property form suggests that a dynamic institutional approach which incorporates organizational actions and strategies would be more appropriate (Scott, 1994b (Scott, , 1995 . Reflections on current theories indicate that a new perspective which is capable of combining institutional processes, cultural evolution and organizational innovation may better capture and explain what happened in Taiwanese business groups during institutional transitions.
The concept of strategic compromise proposed by this article shows promise (Oliver, 1991) . Although Taiwanese business groups did not completely comply with new regulations, they compromised and modified to meet institutional expectations. The mixed configuration shows the permuted logic in structuring ownership of Chinese firms. While preserving the core value of familism, as shown in the consolidation of intra-group holding, founding families also saw the urgency of collaboration and started creating joint properties. While this emerging trend may dilute family ownership in the long run, ignoring institutional forces risks incurring bigger costs -the whole basket of assets. The mixed structure thus suggests a metamorphosed Chinese familism which enables business groups to respond to institutional processes. This strategic compromise is initiated and carried out by organizational actors. While promising in dealing with the complex interactions among institutions, culture and organizations, the compromise argument needs further work. First, to avoid being functional and post-hoc, it is important to trace the path through which the strategic compromise is achieved (Arthur, 1994) . The current study offers important clues. For example, the co-investment ties shown in Figure 6 indicate that business groups did not joint venture into the banking industry randomly but by coherent teams. For instance, the three four-group cliques centred around Banks 3, 4 and 5 and the other three five-group cliques surrounded Banks 10, 11 and 14. There are only a few cross-clique ties in the overall structure. One plausible hypothesis is that Taiwanese business groups achieved the compromise by transforming themselves from 'family business groups' to 'groups of family businesses'. Examining issues such as how the groups team themselves together, how long these joint venture ties last, and whether the same clique composition appears in other industries deepens our understanding of the compromise strategy.
Second, it is equally important to move from the aggregate and clique levels down to the level of individual group and explore what organizational characteristics facilitate and/or impede the capability to achieve strategic compromise. For example, we need to investigate whether the second-generation CEOs, who are assumed to have a different (or less) family ideology, are more likely to establish joint ventures with other family groups; or whether larger (or older) groups with more resources, which are capable of responding to institutional processes independently, are less likely to set up cross-shareholding ties. Examining these issues helps build a better theory of organizational compromise.
Notes
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1. The most salient organizational characteristic of business groups is the quality of being 'neither market nor hierarchy', as described by Granovetter (1985) , Powell (1990) and others. For a theoretical overview of this subject and detailed discussion of other group characteristics, see Strachan (1976) and Granovetter (1995) . 2. Whitley argues that the organizational forms in East Asian capitalisms are largely intact after significant institutional changes and the financial crisis (Whitley, 1999: 182-208) . However, there are no direct, first-hand data provided. 3. The four stages of organizational evolution are emergent, centralized, segmented and disintegrative. The first two stages correspond to the first generation, the founding entrepreneurs; the third stage happens during the transition from the first to the second generation; and the disintegrative stage occurs when the ownership passes to the third generation (Wong, 1985 (Wong, , 1988 . 4. In the legal system with weak protection such as the French civil-law countries (e.g. France, Spain, Argentina and Chile), ownership concentration becomes a functional replacement for legal protection. For countries in strong protection regimes such as the English common-law system (e.g. US, UK, Canada and Australia), ownership is dispersed since concentrated shareholding is unnecessary. 5. According to Liu (1992: 24-8) , there were about 860 units in finance, utilities, transpositions and various manufacturing sectors that were combined and transformed into government-owned enterprises. 6. The process was hastened by the death of President Chiang Ching-Kuo, son of Chiang Kai-Shek, in January 1988. 7. This percentage is calculated by [number of institutional shareholders in the group]/[number of total shareholder positions in the group]. 8. The Business Groups in Taiwan directory does not list the standard by which they define major shareholder. However, the data of the 1100 group firms and their 5577 shareholders reported in the 1994 edition show that on average, the directory lists 5.07 shareholders for each firm (with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 24) and these shareholders own 75 percent of the firm's stock (about 15 percent for each shareholder). 9. The average concentration ratio in these three time points is between 0.38 and 0.44. 10. It is true that many Chinese have the same family names even if they are not related. To ensure I do not overestimate family control, I have randomly chosen five groups for each year (5 percent of the sample) and checked the background of the major shareholders from data sources such as Who is Who in Taiwan's Business, autobiographies of group founders, various business journals and newspapers, and information provided by other versions of the directory Business Groups in Taiwan (1996 Taiwan ( /7, 1998 Taiwan ( /9 and 2000 . For those shareholders I can identify, the result is 100 percent consistent, all shareholders with the same surname are from the founder's family. 11. The procedures clustered group firms into four positions by their patterns of relationships with other member firms within the group. The first position is 'controller' in which are firms that own shares of many other firms and are owned by only a few other group members. The opposite position is the 'receiver'. There is also the position of 'intermediary' in which are firms that invest in substantial numbers of group constituents and are also owned by substantial numbers of other group firms. The final position is the 'isolate', which are firms that have little ownership connection to the rest of the group (see Burt, 1976; Marsden, 1989) . The four-position model worked well in the data and explained 91 percent of the variation for the outdegree of firms and 77 percent of the variation of indegree. More details regarding these procedures can be found in Chung (2000: 51-5) and are also available on request from the author. 12. The mean familism ratio for these 31 groups is 0.54, only slightly higher than the grand average of the 111 groups in 1973 (0.48) and identical to the mean of those groups in 1986 (0.54). 13. To better capture the control centre, I treat the other position involved in the mutuality as controller in the following analysis. 14. In about 60 percent of these groups, the controlling firms dominate more than 50 percent of the stocks of other group firms (on average of a group). For the whole sample, the mean is 58 percent. 15. Most of these corporate shareholders are holding companies or investment companies established by the family. Some of them are regular group firms, in this case, a mutuality of shareholding usually exists. 16. Hamilton suggested that these outside shareholders are not strangers to the founding family. In fact, they are recruited through various pre-existing social relationships such as distant kin, neighbours, friends, or colleagues. Hamilton hence named these shareholder Guanxi investors and the pattern of shareholding, Guanxi ownership (Hamilton, 1997) . 17. For example, the average concentration ratio for 1973, 1986 and 1994 is 0.41, 0.44 and 0.38 while the average familism ratio is 0.48, 0.54 and 0.44. 18. These editions provide data on the top 100 business groups in 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1996. 
